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Abstract
The goal of the paper is to introduce a formulation of the mean field game with major and minor
players as a fixed point on a space of controls. This approach emphasizes naturally the role played by
McKean-Vlasov dynamics in some of the players optimization problems. We apply this approach to
linear quadratic models for which we recover the existing solutions for open loop equilibria, and we
show that we can also provide solutions for closed loop versions of the game. Finally, we implement
numerically our theoretical results on a simple model of flocking.
1 Introduction
Mean field games with major and minor players were introduced with the specific intent to extend the
realm of applications of the original mean field game paradigm to realistic models for which subgroups of
players do not grow in size and as a result, their influence on the remaining population of players, does
not disappear in the asymptotic regime of large games. While this generalization captures new potential
applications, it raises the technological bar in terms of the sophistication of the tools to be used in order
to come up with solutions, bringing these models up to par with mean field games with common noise.
See for example the monograph [1] or the last chapter of [3] for details.
As far as we know, the earliest instance of such a generalization appeared in [6] which proposed a
linear-quadratic infinite-horizon model with a major player. Soon after, the finite-horizon counterpart of
the model was considered in [9] and a first generalization to nonlinear cases was proposed in [11]. We
believe theses are the first models of what is now called ’mean field games with major and minor players’.
Still, the state of the major player does not enter the dynamics of the minor players, it only appears in
their cost functionals. Later on [10] discussed a new approach to linear quadratic games in which the
major player’s state enters the dynamics of the minor players. The authors solve the limiting control
problem for the major player using a trick they call “anticipative variational calculation”.
The asymmetry between major and minor players was emphasized in [1] where the authors insist
on the fact that the statistical distribution of the state of a generic minor player should be derived
endogenously. Like in [8], the paper [1] characterizes the limiting problem by a set of stochastic partial
differential equations. While working with the open loop formulation of the problem, the more recent
account [4] also insists on the endogenous nature of the statical distribution of the state of a generic minor
player. In fact, it goes one step further by reformulating the Mean Field Game with major and minor
players as the search for a Nash equilibrium in a two player game over the time evolutions of states, some
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of which being of a McKean-Vlasov type. Note that, despite the fact that they offer a formal discussion
of the general case, both papers [1] and [4] can only provide solutions in the linear quadratic case. For
the sake of completeness, we also mention the recent technical report [7] where a major player is added
to a particular case of the extended (in the sense that the interaction is through the controls) mean field
game model of optimal execution introduced in Chapter 1 and solved in Chapter 4 of [2]. Because of
the absence of idiosyncratic noise, the initial conditions of the minor player states are assumed to be
independent identically distributed random variables. The authors formulate a fixed point equilibrium
problem when the rate of trading of the major player is restricted to be a linear function of the average
rate of trading of the minor players, and they solve this fixed point problem with deterministic controls
in the infinite horizon stationary case.
In this paper, we present an alternative formulation for the Mean Field Games with major and minor
players. In this approach, the search for Nash equilibria is naturally framed as the search for fixed points
for the best response function for both types of players. As a fringe benefit we are able to formulate
and tackle the open and closed loop versions of the problem in one go. Beyond the fact that [1] seems
to be dealing only with the closed loop formulation of the problem, the main difference is the fact that
instead of looking for a global Nash equilibrium of the whole system, including major and minor players,
the authors choose a Stackelberg game strategy in which the major player goes first and chooses its own
control to minimize its expected cost, assuming that the response of the minor players to the choice of its
control will be to put themselves in the (hopefully unique) mean field game equilibrium in the random
environment induced by the control of the major player. As a result, the finite-player game which is
actually solved in [1], is merely a N -player game including only the minor players. In particular, the
associated propagation of chaos is just a randomized version of the usual propagation of chaos associated
to the usual mean field games. Here we follow the same line of attack as in [4], making sure that the
approximate equilibria obtained for finite player games are in fact (N+1)-player game equilibria including
the major player as well as the N minor players.
The paper is structured as follows. Our formulation of mean field games with major and minor
players is presented in Section 2 below. There, we emphasize that as it relies on a fixed point argument
in spaces of controls, and we explain how this approach can be used to tackle all sorts of versions of
the game, whether the search is for open or closed loop (or even Markovian) equilibria. Next, Section 3
implements this approach in the case of linear quadratic models. We recover the open loop solution of [4],
and provide a solution for closed loop models. Section 4 concludes with the solution of a generalization
including a major player to the mean field game formulation proposed in [8] of a flocking model originally
credited to Cucker and Smale [5]. There, the dynamics of a large population of agents are governed by
forces depicting the mean reversion of individual velocity to the mean velocity of the population. While
early models of flocking do not involve any form of central coordination, several authors recently propose
generalization of the flocking model by introducing leaders in the population. Such leaders have a pivotal
impact on the rest of the population. In this spirit, we extend the mean field game formulation of [8] to
include a major player which in equilibrium, should act as a free-will leader. We solve this model in the
linear quadratic case, and we provide numerical simulations of the solution.
2
2 Alternative Formulations for Mean Field Games with Major and
Minor Players
The goal of this section is to formulate the search for Nash equilibria for mean field games with major and
minor players as a fixed point problem on a space of admissible controls. Since our discussion remains at
the formal level, we do not introduce these mean field game models as limits of finite player games. We
shall do just that only in the case of the linear quadratic models which we solve explicitly in Section 3
below. For pedagogical reasons, we treat separately the open and closed loop problems. The rationale
for this decision comes from the fact that, while solutions to the open and closed loop versions of the
standard games often coincide in the mean field limit, this does not seem to be the case for games with
major and minor players. Indeed, the characteristics of the state of the major player do not disappear in
the limit when the number of minor players tends to infinity. We shall illustrate this fact in our discussion
of the linear quadratic models below.
The general set up of a mean field game with major and minor players is as follows. The dynamics
of the state of the system are given by stochastic differential equations of the form:{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , αt, α
0
t )dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , αt, α
0
t dWt,
(1)
where W 0 = (W 0t )0≤t≤T and W = (Wt)0≤t≤T are independent Wiener processes in Rd0 and Rd respec-
tively, the quantities X0t , α
0
t with a superscript 0 representing the state and the control of the major
player while the he quantities Xt, αt without a superscript represent the state and the control of the
representative minor player. The controls α0t and αt take values in closed convex subsets A0 and A of
Euclidean spaces Rk0 and Rk. Here µ = (µt)0≤t≤T is a measure valued process which in equilibrium, is
expected to be given by the conditional distributions of the state of the representative minor player given
the filtration F0 = (F0t )0≤t≤T generated by the Wiener process W 0 driving the dynamics of the state
of the major player. Indeed, µt should be understood as a proxy for the empirical measure µ
N
t of the
states of N minor players in the limit N →∞. This limit is expected to be µt = PXt|W 0[0,t] = L(Xt|W
0
[0,t])
the conditional distribution of the state of the representative minor player given the initial path W 0[0,t] of
the noise common to all the minor players, namely the noise term driving the equation for the state of
the major player. For later reference, we shall denote by F = (Ft)0≤t≤T the filtration generated by both
Wiener processes.
The costs the players try to minimize are of the form:{
J0(α0,α) = E
[∫ T
0 f0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dt+ g
0(X0T , µT )
]
J(α0,α) = E
[∫ T
0 f(t,Xt, µ
N
t , X
0
t , αt, α
0
t )dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
,
(2)
for some running and terminal cost functions f0, f , g0 and g. The crucial feature of mean field games
with major and minor players is that the dynamics of the state and the costs of the major player depend
upon the statistical distribution of the states of the minor players while the states and the costs of the
minor players depend upon not only their own states and the statistical distribution of the states of all
the minor players, but also on the state and the control of the major player. This is what makes the
analysis of these games more difficult than the standard mean field game models.
We first treat the case of open loop equilibria for which we take advantage of the fact that the
filtrations are assumed to be generated by the Wiener processes, to write the controls as functions of the
paths of these Wiener processes.
3
Open Loop Version of the MFG Problem
Here, we assume that the controls used by the major player and the representative minor player are of
the form:
α0t = φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]), and αt = φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), (3)
for deterministic progressively measurable functions φ0 : [0, T ] × C([0, T ];Rd0) 7→ A0 and φ : [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ];Rd)×C([0, T ];Rd) 7→ A. Progressive measurability of the function φ means that for each t ∈ [0, T ],
and w0, w ∈ C([0, T ];Rd), the value of φ(t, w0, w) depends only upon the restrictions w0[0,t] and w[0,t] of w0
and w to the interval [0, t]. Similarly for φ0. Our choice for the admissibility of the controls is consistent
with our earlier discussion since we assume that the filtration F0 and F are generated by the Wiener
processes W 0 and (W 0,W ) respectively.
We understand a Nash equilibrium as a fixed point of the best response map. In the present context,
the latter comprises two specific components: the best response of the major player to the behavior of all
the minor players, and the best response of a representative minor player to the behavior of the major
player and all the other minor players. So we need two separate steps to identify the best response map
before we can define a Nash equilibrium as a fixed point of this map.
The Major Player Best Response. We assume that the representative minor player uses the open loop
control given by the progressively measurable function φ : (t, w0, w) 7→ φ(t, w0, w), so the problem of the
major player is to minimize its expected cost:
Jφ,0(α0) = E
[∫ T
0
f0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dt+ g
0(X0T , µT )
]
(4)
under the dynamical constraints:{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), α
0
t )dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), α
0
t )dWt,
where µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]) denotes the conditional distribution of Xt given W 0[0,t]. Since we are considering
the open loop version of the problem, we search for minima in the class of controls α0 of the form
α0t = φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]) for a progressively measurable function φ
0. So we frame the major player problem as
the search for:
φ0,∗(φ) = arg inf
α0↔φ0
Jφ,0(α0) (5)
where α0 ↔ φ0 means that the infimum is over the set of controls α0 given by progressively measurable
functions φ0. For the sake of the present discussion, we assume implicitly that the argument of the
minimization is not empty and reduces to a singleton. The important feature of this formulation is that
the optimization of the major player appears naturally as an optimal control of the McKean-Vlasov type!
In fact, it is an optimal control of the conditional McKean-Vlasov type since the distribution appearing
in the controlled dynamics is the conditional distribution of the state of the representative minor player.
The Representative Minor Player Best Response. To formulate the optimization problem of the repre-
sentative minor player, we first describe the state of a system comprising a major player and a field of
minor players different from the representative minor player we are focusing on. So we assume that the
major player uses a strategy α0 given by a progressively measurable function φ0 as in α0t = φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]),
4
and that the representative of the field of minor players uses a strategy α given by a progressively mea-
surable function φ in the form αt = φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]). So the dynamics of the state of the system are
given by: 
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dt
+σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dWt,
where as before, µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]) is the conditional distribution of Xt given W 0[0,t]. Notice that in the
present situation, given the feedback functions φ0 and φ, this stochastic differential equation in Rd0 ×Rd
giving the dynamics of the state of the system is of (conditional) McKean-Vlasov type since µt is the
(conditional) distribution of (part of) the state.
As explained earlier, we frame the problem of the representative minor player as the search for the best
response to the major player and the field of the (other) minor players. So naturally, we formulate this
best response as the result of the optimization problem of a virtual (extra) minor player which chooses
a strategy α given by a progressively measurable function φ in the form αt = φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]) in order
to minimize its expected cost:
Jφ
0,φ(α¯) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt, α¯t, φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dt+ g(XT , µt)
]
,
where the dynamics of the virtual state Xt are given by:
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ¯(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dt
+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ¯(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]), φ
0(t,W 0[0,T ]))dW t,
for a Wiener process W = (W t)0≤t≤T independent of the other Wiener processes. Notice that this
optimization problem is not of McKean-Vlasov type. It is merely a classical optimal control problem,
though with random coefficients. As stated above, we search for minima in the class of feedback controls
α of the form αt = φ(t,W
0
[0,T ],W[0,T ]). We denote by:
φ
∗
(φ0, φ) = arg inf
α↔φ
Jφ
0,φ(α¯) (6)
the result of the optimization. Again, we assume that the optimal control exists, is given by a progressively
measurable function, and is unique for the sake of convenience.
We now formulate the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the mean field game with major and minor
player as a fixed point of the best response maps identified above by its components (5) and (6). So by
definition, a couple (αˆ0, αˆ) of controls given by progressively measurable functions (φˆ0, φˆ) as above is
a Nash equilibrium for the mean field game with major and minor players if it satisfies the fixed point
equation:
(φˆ0, φˆ) =
(
φ0,∗(φˆ), φ¯∗(φˆ0, φˆ)
)
. (7)
5
Closed Loop Version of the MFG Problem
The way we rewrote the open loop version of the problem may have been rather pompous, but it makes it
easy to introduce the closed loop and Markovian versions of the problem. In this subsection, we assume
that the controls used by the major player and the representative minor player are of the form:
α0t = φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt), and αt = φ(t,X[0,T ], µt, X
0
[0,T ]), i = 1, · · · , N.
for deterministic progressively measurable functions φ0 : [0, T ] × C([0, T ];Rd0) 7→ A0 and φ : [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ];Rd)×C([0, T ];Rd) 7→ A. The state X0t of the major player and the state Xt of the representative
minor player evolve according to the same dynamic equations (1) as before, and the costs are also given
by the same formula (2), with µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]). We follow the same strategy as above to define the
closed loop Nash equilibria of the game.
The Major Player Best Response. We assume that the representative minor player uses the progressively
measurable feedback function φ : (t, x, µ, x0) 7→ φ(t, x, µ, x0), so the problem of the major player is to
minimize its expected cost (4) under the dynamical constraints:{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,X[0,T ], µt, X
0
[0,T ]), α
0
t )dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,X[0,T ], µt, X
0
[0,T ]), α
0
t )dW
i
t ,
whereas before µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]) denotes the conditional distribution of Xt given W 0[0,t]. As explained
earlier, we search for minima in the class of feedback controls α0 of the form α0t = φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt), so we
frame the major player problem as:
φ0,∗(φ) = arg inf
α0↔φ0
Jφ,0(α0) (8)
which is an optimal control of the conditional McKean-Vlasov type!
The Representative Minor Player Best Response. To formulate the optimization problem of the repre-
sentative minor player, we first describe a system to which it needs to respond optimally. So we assume
that the major player uses a strategy α0 in feedback form given by a feedback function φ0 so that
α0t = φ
0(t,X0[0,T ]µt), and that the representative of the field of minor players uses a strategy α given by
a progressively measurable feedback function φ in the form αt = φ(t,X[0,T ], X
0
[0,T ], µt). So the dynamics
of the state of this system are given by:
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt))dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt))dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,X[0,T ], X
0
[0,T ], µt), φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt))dt
+σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,X[0,T ], X
0
[0,T ], µt), φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt))dWt,
where as before, µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]) is the conditional distribution of Xt given W 0[0,t]. Again, given the
feedback functions φ0 and φ, this stochastic differential equation in Rd0 ×Rd is of (conditional) McKean-
Vlasov type.
As expected, we formulate this best response of the representative minor player as the result of the
optimization problem of a virtual (extra) minor player which chooses a strategy α given by a feedback
function φ in the form αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt) in order to minimize its expected cost:
Jφ
0,φ(α¯) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt, α¯t, φ
0(t,X0[0,T ]µt))dt+ g(XT , µt)
]
,
6
where the dynamics of the virtual state Xt are given by:
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ¯(t,X [0,T ], X
0
[0,T ], µt), φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt))dt
+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ¯(t,X [0,T ], X
0
[0,T ], µt), φ
0(t,X0[0,T ], µt))dW t,
for a Wiener process W = (W t)0≤t≤T independent of the other Wiener processes. We search for minima
in the class of feedback controls α of the form αt = φ(t,X [0,T ], µt, X
0
[0,T ]), and we denote the solution by:
φ
∗
(φ0, φ) = arg inf
α↔φ
Jφ
0,φ(α¯). (9)
Since the best response map is given by its components (8) and (9), we define the solution of a Nash
equilibrium for the closed loop mean field game with major and minor player as the solution of the same
fixed point equation (7), except for the fact that the functions (φˆ0, φˆ) are now progressively measurable
feedback functions of the type considered here.
2.0.1 Markovian Version of the MFG Problem
Here, we assume that the controls used by the major player and the representative minor player are of
the form:
α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , µt), and αt = φ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t ), i = 1, · · · , N.
for deterministic feedback functions φ0 : [0, T ]×Rd0×P2(Rd) 7→ A0 and φ : [0, T ]×Rd×P2(Rd)×Rd0 7→ A.
The state X0t of the major player and the state Xt of the representative minor player evolve according
to the same dynamic equations (1) as before and the costs are also given by the same formula (2), with
µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]).
The Major Player Best Response. We assume that the representative minor player uses the feedback
function φ : (t, x, µ, x0) 7→ φ(t, x, µ, x0), so the problem of the major player is to minimize its expected
cost (4) under the dynamical constraints:{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, α
0
t )dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t ), α
0
t )dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t ), α
0
t )dW
i
t ,
where as before µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]) denotes the conditional distribution of Xt given W 0[0,t]. We search for
minima in the class of feedback controls α0 of the form α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , µt), so we frame the major player
problem as:
φ0,∗(φ) = arg inf
α0↔φ0
Jφ,0(α0) (10)
As before, the optimization problem of the major player is of the conditional Mckean-Vlasov type.
The Representative Minor Player Best Response. To formulate the optimization problem of the repre-
sentative minor player, we first describe a system to which it needs to respond optimally. So we assume
that the major player uses a strategy α0 in feedback form given by a feedback function φ0 so that
α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , µt), and that the representative of the field of minor players uses a strategy α given by
a feedback function φ in the form αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt). So the dynamics of the state of this system are
given by:{
dX0t = b0(t,X
0
t , µt, φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dt+ σ0(t,X
0
t , µt, φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dW
0
t
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt), φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dt+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt), φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dWt,
7
where as before, µt = L(Xt|W 0[0,t]) is the conditional distribution of Xt given W 0[0,t]. Again, given the
feedback functions φ0 and φ, this stochastic differential equation in Rd0 ×Rd is of (conditional) McKean-
Vlasov type.
As before, we frame the problem of the representative minor player as the search for the best response
to the behavior of the major player and the field of the (other) minor players. So we solve the optimization
problem of a virtual (extra) minor player which chooses a strategy α given by a feedback function φ in
the form αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt) in order to minimize its expected cost:
Jφ
0,φ(α¯) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt, α¯t, φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dt+ g(XT , µt)
]
,
where the dynamics of the virtual state Xt are given by:
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ¯(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt), φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dt
+ σ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t , φ¯(t,Xt, X
0
t , µt), φ
0(t,X0t , µt))dW t,
for a Wiener process W = (W t)0≤t≤T independent of the other Wiener processes. We search for minima
in the class of feedback controls α of the form αt = φ(t,Xt, µt, X
0
t ), and we denote the solution by:
φ
∗
(φ0, φ) = arg inf
α↔φ
Jφ
0,φ(α¯). (11)
Finally, we define the solution of a Nash equilibrium for the Markovian mean field game with major and
minor player as the solution of the same fixed point equation (7), except for the fact that the functions
(φˆ0, φˆ) are now feedback functions of the type considered here.
3 Linear Quadratic Models
In this section, we consider the mean field game with major and minor players issued from the finite
player game in which the dynamics of the states of the players are given by the following linear stochastic
differential equations:{
dXN,0t = (L0X
N,0
t +B0α
N,0
t + F0X¯
N
t )dt+D0dW
0
t ,
dXN,it = (LX
N,i
t +Bα
N,i
t + FX¯
N
t +GX
0
t )dt+DdW
i
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
(12)
for t ∈ [0, T ], and we choose A0 = Rk0 and A = Rk. The coefficients are deterministic constant matrices
independent of time. The real matrices L0, B0, F0 and D0 are of dimensions d0× d0, d0× k0, d0× d and
d0×m0 respectively. Similarly, the real matrices L, B, F , G and D are of dimensions d× d, d× k, d× d,
d× d0, and d0 ×m0 respectively. The cost functionals for the major and minor players are given by:
JN,0
(
αN,0, · · · ,αN,N)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
[(
XN,0t −Ψ0(X¯Nt )
)†
Q0
(
XN,0t −Ψ0(X¯Nt )
)
+ (αN,0t )
†R0α
N,0
t
]
dt
]
,
JN,i
(
αN,0, · · · ,αN,N)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
[(
XN,it −Ψ(XN,0t , X¯Nt )
)†
Q
(
XN,it −Ψ(XN,0t , X¯Nt )) + (αN,it )†RαN,it
]
dt
]
,
8
in which Q0, Q, R0 and R are positive definite symmetric matrices of dimensions d0 × d0, d× d, k0 × k0
and k × k, and where the functions Ψ0 and Ψ are defined by:
Ψ0(X) = H0X + η0, Ψ(X,Y ) = HX +H1Y + η,
for some fixed d0 × d, d × d0 and d × d matrices H0, H and H1, and some fixed η0 ∈ Rd0 and η ∈ Rd.
Here, X¯Nt stands for the empirical mean (X
N,1
t + · · ·+XN,Nt )/N .
We chose to study this specific linear quadratic model to match existing literature on the subject. Sev-
eral variants are possible which can be treated using the same procedure. See for example the application
discussed in Section 4 below.
Open-Loop Equilibrium
In the mean field limit, the dynamics (12) of the major player state X0t and the state Xt of the represen-
tative minor player are given by:{
dX0t = (L0X
0
t +B0α
0
t + F0X¯t)dt+D0dW
0
t
dXt = (LXt +Bαt + FX¯t +GX
0
t )dt+DdWt
(13)
where X¯t = E[Xt|F0t ] is the conditional expectation of Xt with respect to the filtration generated by the
history of the Wiener process W 0 up to time t. Accordingly, the cost functionals for the major and minor
players are given by:
J0(α0,α) = E
[∫ T
0
[(X0t −H0X¯t − η0)†Q0(X0t −H0X¯t − η0) + α0†t R0α0t ]dt
]
J(α0,α) = E
[∫ T
0
[(Xt −HX0t −H1X¯t − η)†Q(Xt −HX0t −H1X¯t − η) + α†tRαt]dt
]
in which Q, Q0, R, R0 are symmetric matrices, and R, R0 are assumed to be positive definite. Taking
conditional expectations in the equation for the state of the representative minor player we get:
dX¯t = [(L+ F )X¯t +Bαt +GX
0
t ] dt, (14)
with αt = E[αt|F0t ]. The idea is now to express the optimization problem of the major player over the
dynamics of the couple (Xt, X
0
t ). In order to do so, we introduce the following notation:
Xt =
[
X¯t
X0t
]
, L0 =
[
L+ F G
F0 L0
]
, B0 =
[
0
B0
]
, B =
[
B
0
]
,D0 =
[
0
D0
]
F0 =
[
H†0Q0H0 −H†0Q0
−Q0H0 Q0
]
, f0 =
[
H†0Q0η0
−Q0η0
]
.
Notice that, the fact that the matrix Q0 is symmetric non-negative definite implies that F0 is also
symmetric non-negative definite. This will play a crucial role when we face the solution of certain matrix
Riccati equations. The optimization problem of the major player becomes:
inf
α0∈A˚0
E
[∫ T
0
[X†tF0Xt + 2X
†
tf0 + η
†
0Q0η0 + α
0†
t R0α
0
t ]dt
]
,
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where the controlled dynamics are given by:
dXt = (L0Xt + B0α0t + Bαt)dt+ D0dW 0t . (15)
The reduced Hamiltonian is given by:
H(r),α(t, x, y, α0) = y†(L0x+ B0α0 + Bαt) + x†F0x+ 2x†f0 + η†0Q0η0 + α
0†R0α0.
Here we added the superscript α for the Hamiltonian in order to emphasize that the optimization of
the major player is performed assuming that the representative minor player is using strategy α ∈ A˚.
Obviously, H(r),α is a random function, the randomness coming from the realization of the control of the
representative minor player. However we see that almost surely Rd0+d×A0 3 (x, α0)→ H(r),α(t, x, y, α0)
is jointly convex, and we can use the sufficient condition of the stochastic maximum principle. Therefore
the minimizer of the reduced Hamiltonian and the optimal control are given by:
αˆ0 = −1
2
R−10 B
0†y, and αˆ0t = −
1
2
R−10 B
0†Yt,
respectively, where (Xt,Yt)0≤t≤T solves the forward-backward stochastic differential equation:dXt = (L0Xt −
1
2
B0R−10 B
†
0Yt + Bαt)dt+ D0dW
0
t
dYt = −(L†0Yt + 2F0Xt + 2f0)dt+ ZtdW 0t , YT = 0.
(16)
We now consider the representative minor player’s problem. We fix an admissible strategy α0 ∈ A˚0
for the major player, and an admissible strategy α ∈ A˚ for the representative of the other minor players,
and its F0-optional projection α defined by αt = E[αt|F0t ]. This prescription leads to the time evolution
of the state of a system given by (13), equation (14) after taking conditional expectations, and finally the
dynamic equation (25). Given this background state evolution, the representative minor player needs to
solve:
inf
α˜∈A˚
E
[∫ T
0
[(X˜t − [H1, H]Xt − η)†Q(X˜t − [H1, H]Xt − η) + α˜†tRα˜t]dt
]
,
where the dynamics of the controlled state X˜t are given by:
dX˜t = (LX˜t +Bα˜t + [F,G]Xt)dt+DdWt.
Note that the process Xt is merely part of the random coefficients of the optimization problem. We
introduce the reduced Hamiltonian:
H(r),α
0,α(t, x˜, y˜, α˜) = y˜†(Lx˜+Bα˜+ [F,G]Xt)
+ (x˜− [H1, H]Xt − η)†Q(x˜− [H1, H]Xt − η) + α˜†Rα˜.
Once again we use the superscript (α0, α) to emphasize the fact that the optimization is performed under
the environment created by the major player using strategy α0 and the population of the other minor
players using α, leading to the use of its F0-optional projection α. H(r),α0,α depends on the random
realization of the environment and is almost surely jointly convex in (x˜, α˜). Applying the stochastic
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maximum principle, the optimal control exists and is given by α˜t = −12R−1B†Y˜t, where (X˜, Y˜ ) solves
the following FBSDE:{
dX˜t = (LX˜t −BR−1B†Y˜t + [F,G]X˜t)dt+DdWt
dY˜t = −
(
L†Y˜t + 2Q
(
Xt − [H1, H]X˜t − η
))
dt+ ZtdWt + Z
0
t dW
0
t ,
(17)
with terminal condition YT = 0. Recall that in this FBSDE, the process (Xt)0≤t≤T only acts as a random
coefficient. It is determined off line by solving the standard stochastic differential equation:
dX˜t = (L0X˜t + B0α0t + Bαt)dt+ D0dW 0t (18)
Notice that equation (18) is exactly the same equation as (25). Still, we use a different notation for the
solution. Indeed, at this stage of the proof (i.e. before considering the fixed point step), the coefficient
processes (α0t )0≤t≤T and (αt)0≤t≤T are (likely to be) different, preventing us from identifying the solutions
of (18) and (25).
Now that we are done characterizing the solutions of both optimization problems, we identify the
fixed point constraint in the framework given by the characterizations of the two optimization problems,
The fixed point condition (7) characterizing Nash equilibria in the current set-up says that:
α0t = −
1
2
R−10 B
†
0Yt,
where (Yt)0≤t≤T is the backward component of the solution of (16) with αt = E[αt|F0t ], and:
αt = α˜t = −1
2
R−1B†Y˜t,
where (Y˜t)0≤t≤T is the backward component of the solution of (17) in which the random coefficient
(X˜t)0≤t≤T solves (18) with the processes (α0t )0≤t≤T and (αt)0≤t≤T just defined. So in equilibrium, equa-
tions (18) and (25) have the same coefficients and we can identify their solutions (Xt)0≤t≤T and (X˜t)0≤t≤T .
The optimal controls for the major and representative minor players are functions of the solution of
the following FBSDE which we obtain by putting together the FBSDEs (16) and (17) characterizing the
major and representative minor players’ optimization problem:
dXt = (L0Xt − 1
2
B0R−10 B
†
0Yt −
1
2
BR−1B†E[Y˜t|F0t ])dt+ D0dW 0t
dX˜t = (LX˜t − 1
2
BR−1B†Y˜t + [F,G]Xt)dt+DdWt
dYt = −(L†0Yt + F0Xt + f0)dt+ ZtdW 0t , YT = 0
dY˜t = −(L†Y˜t + 2QX˜t − 2Q[H1, H]Xt − 2Qη)dt+ ZtdWt + Z0t dW 0t , Y˜T = 0.
(19)
We summarize the above discussion in the form of a verification theorem for open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. If the system (19) admits a solution, then the linear quadratic mean field game problem
with major and minor players admits an open-loop Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy (α0,α)
is given by αˆ0t = −(1/2)R−10 B†0Yt for the major player and αˆt = −(1/2)R−1BY˜t for the representative
minor player.
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The way the system (19) is stated is a natural conclusion of the search for equilibrium as formulated
by the fixed point step following the two optimization problems. However, as convenient as can be, simple
remarks can help the solution of this system. First we notice one could solve for (Xt,Yt)0≤t≤T by solving
the FBSDE formed by the first and the third equations if we knew Y t = E[Y˜t|F0t ]. By taking conditional
expectations with respect to F0t in the second equation, and by subtracting the result from the equation
satisfied by the first component of the first equation, we identify E[X˜t|F0t ] with Xt because they have
the same initial conditions. Next, by taking conditional expectations with respect to F0t in the fourth
equation, we see that (Y t)0≤t≤T should satisfy:
dY t = −(L†Y t +QXt −Q[H1, H]Xt −Qη)dt+ Z0tdW 0t , Y T = 0
Consequently, the solution of (19) also satisfies:
dXt = (L0Xt − 1
2
B0R−10 B
†
0Yt −
1
2
BR−1B†Y t)dt+ D0dW 0t
dYt = −(L†0Yt + 2F0Xt + 2f0)dt+ ZtdW 0t , YT = 0
dY t = −
(
L†Y t + 2
(
[Q, 0]−Q[H1, H]
)
Xt − 2Qη
)
dt+ Z
0
tdW
0
t , Y T = 0.
(20)
Our final remark is that the solution of system (20) is not only necessary, but also sufficient. Indeed,
once it is solved, one can solve for (X˜t, Y˜t)0≤t≤T by solving the affine FBSDE with random coefficients
formed by the second and fourth equations of (19) and check that E[Y˜t|F0t ] is indeed the solution of the
third equation of (20).
Identifying Yt with [P
†
t , P
0†
t ]
† we recognize the FBSDE used in [4].
A Closed Loop Equilibrium
In this section we implement the closed loop alternative formulation of the equilibrium problem. Since
we expect that the optimal controls will be in feedback form, we search directly for Markovian controls.
In other words, we assume that the controls used by major player and minor players are respectively of
the form:
α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , X¯t), and αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , X¯t),
for some Rk0 and Rk valued deterministic functions φ0 and φ defined on [0, T ]×Rd0×Rd and [0, T ]×Rd×
Rd0 × Rd respectively. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that A0 = Rk0 and A = Rk. So the major
player can only observe its own state and the mean of minor player’s states, while the representative
minor player can observe its own state, the state of the major player, as well as the mean of the other
minor players’ states. This version of the equilibrium problem is more difficult than its open loop analog.
For that reason, we are not trying to construct the best response map for all the possible choices of
control processes α0 and α. Instead, we construct it for a restricted class of feedback functions φ0 and
φ in which we can still find a fixed point, hence a Nash equilibrium.
To be more specific, we construct the best responses to controls α0 and α of the form:
α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , X¯t) = φ
0
0(t) + φ
0
1(t)X
0
t + φ
0
2(t)X¯t (21)
αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , X¯t) = φ0(t) + φ1(t)Xt + φ2(t)X
0
t + φ3(t)X¯t (22)
where the functions [0, T ] 3 t → φ0i (t) for i = 0, 1, 2 and [0, T ] 3 t → φi(t) for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 are matrix-
valued deterministic continuous functions with the appropriate dimensions, in other words, φ00(t) ∈ Rk0 ,
φ01(t) ∈ Rk0×d0 , φ02(t) ∈ Rk0×d, φ0(t) ∈ Rk, φ1(t) ∈ Rk×d, φ2(t) ∈ Rk×d0 , and φ3(t) ∈ Rk×d.
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We first consider the major player’s optimization problem. We assume that the representative minor
player uses strategy αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , X¯t) as specified in (22). Next we look for the control α
0 which
could be used by the major player to minimize its expected cost. The dynamics of the system is then
given by:{
dX0t = (L0X
0
t +B0α
0
t + F0X¯t)dt+D0dW
0
t
dXt =
[
Bφ0(t) + (L+Bφ1(t))Xt + (Bφ2(t) +G)X
0
t + (Bφ3(t) + F )Xt)
]
dt+DdWt,
(23)
where as before Xt = E[Xt|F0t ] is the conditional expectation of Xt with respect to the filtration generated
by the history of the Wiener process W 0 up to time t. In their current form, the dynamics of the couple
(X0t , Xt) are of a McKean-Vlasov type since the mean of Xt appears in the coefficients of the equation
giving dX0t . However, in order to find a minimalist version of dynamical equations for a state over which
the optimization problem of the major player can be formulated, we take conditional expectations in the
equation for the state of the representative minor player. We get:
dXt =
[
Bφ0(t) + (L+B[φ1(t) + φ3(t)] + F )Xt + (Bφ2(t) +G)X
0
t
]
dt. (24)
As in the case of the open loop version of the equilibrium problem, we express the optimization problem
of the major player over the dynamics of the couple (Xt, X
0
t ). In order to do so, we use the same notation
Xt, F0, f0, B0, B, D and D0 as in the case of our analysis of the open loop problem, and we introduce the
following new notation:
L(cl)0 (t) =
[
L+B[φ1(t) + φ3(t)] + F Bφ2(t) +G
F0 L0
]
, C(cl)0 =
[
Bφ0(t)
0
]
,
and the optimization problem of the major player can be formulated exactly as in the open loop case as
the minimization:
inf
α0∈A˚0
E
[∫ T
0
[X†tF0Xt + 2X
†
tf0 + η
†
0Q0η0 + α
0†
t R0α
0
t ]dt
]
where the controlled dynamics are given by:
dXt =
[
L(cl)0 (t)Xt + B0α
0
t + C
(cl)
0 (t)
]
dt+ D0dW 0t . (25)
The reduced Hamiltonian (minus the term η†0Q0η0 which is irrelevant) is given by:
H(r),φ(t, x, y, α0) = y†[L(cl)0 x+ B0α
0 + Ccl(t)] + x†F0x+ 2x†f0 + α0†R0α0.
Applying the stochastic maximum principle, we find that the optimal control is given as before by
αˆ0t = −(1/2)R−10 B†0Yt, where (Xt,Yt,Zt)0≤t≤T solves the linear FBSDE:{
dXt = [L
(cl)
0 (t)Xt − 12B0R−10 B†0Yt + C
(cl)
0 (t)]dt+ D0dW 0t
dYt = −[L(cl)0 (t)†Yt + 2F0Xt + 2f0)dt+ ZtdW 0t , YT = 0.
(26)
This FBSDE being affine, we expect the decoupling field to be affine as well, so we search for a solution
of the form Yt = KtXt+kt for two deterministic functions t 7→ Kt ∈ R(d+d0)×(d+d0) and t 7→ kt ∈ R(d+d0).
We compute dYt applying Itoˆ’s formula to this ansatz, and using the expression for dXt given by the
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forward equation. Identifying term by term the result with the right hand side of the backward component
of the above FBSDE we obtain the following system of ordinary differential equations:{
0 = K˙t − 12KtB0R−10 B†0Kt +KtL
(cl)
0 (t) + L
(cl)
0 (t)
†Kt + F0, KT = 0
0 = k˙t +
(
L(cl)0 (t)† − 12KtB0R−10 B†0
)
kt +KtC
(cl)
0 (t) + 2f0, kT = 0.
(27)
For any choice of a continuous strategy t 7→ (φ0(t), φ1(t), φ2(t), φ3(t)), the first equation is a standard
matrix Riccati differential equation. Since the coefficients are continuous and F0 is positive definite, the
equation admits a unique global solution over [0, T ] for any T > 0. Recall that R0 is symmetric and
positive definite. Injecting the solution t 7→ Kt into the second equation yields a linear ordinary differential
equation with continuous coefficients for which the global unique solvability also holds. Therefore the
FBSDE (26) is uniquely solvable and the optimal control exists and is given by:
α0∗t = −
1
2
R−10 B
†
0KtXt −
1
2
R−10 B
†
0kt, (28)
which is an affine function of X0t and X¯t.
We now turn to representative minor player optimization problem. We assume that the major player
uses the feedback strategy α0t = φ
0(t,X0t , X¯t) and the representative of the other minor players uses the
feedback strategy αt = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , X¯t) of the forms (21) and (22) respectively. These choices lead to the
dynamics of the state Xt = [X
†
t , X
0†
t ]
† given by:
dXt = [L(cl)(t)Xt + C(cl)(t)]dt+ D0dW 0t
with:
L(cl)(t) =
[
L+ F +B(φ1(t) + φ3(t)) G+Bφ2(t)
F0 +B0φ
0
2(t) L0 +B0φ
0
1(t)
]
, C(cl)(t) =
[
Bφ0(t)
B0φ
0
0(t)
]
.
We wrote L(cl)(t) and C(cl)(t) instead of L(cl),φ0,φ(t) and C(cl),φ0,φ(t) in order to simplify the notation. In
this environment, we search for the best response of a representative minor player trying to minimize as
earlier,
inf
α˜∈A˚
E
[∫ T
0
[(X˜t − [H1, H]Xt − η)†Q(X˜t − [H1, H]Xt − η) + α˜†tRα˜t]dt
]
,
where the dynamics of the controlled state X˜t are given as before by:
dX˜t = (LX˜t +Bα˜t + [F,G]Xt)dt+DdWt.
Again the process Xt is merely part of the random coefficients of the optimization problem. We introduce
the reduced Hamiltonian:
H(r),φ
0,φ(t, x˜, y˜, α˜) = y˜†(Lx˜+Bα˜+ [F,G]Xt)
+ (x˜− [H1, H]Xt − η)†Q(x˜− [H1, H]Xt − η) + α˜†Rα˜.
and we find that the optimal control is given by α˜∗t = −12R−1B†Yt, where (X˜t,Xt, Y˜t, Z˜t, Z˜0t )0≤t≤T solves
the linear FBSDE:
dX˜t = (LX˜t −BR−1B†Y˜t + [F,G]Xt)dt+DdWt
dXt = [L(cl)(t)Xt + C(cl)(t)]dt+ D0dW 0t
dY˜t = −(L†Y˜t +QX˜t −Q[H1, H]Xt −Qη)dt+ Z˜tdWt + Z˜0t dW 0t , YT = 0.
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Again we search for a solution of the form Y˜t = StXt + StX˜t + st for continuous deterministic functions
t 7→ St ∈ Rd×(d+d0), t 7→ St ∈ Rd×d and t 7→ st ∈ Rd. Proceeding as before, we see that these functions
provide a solution to the above FBSDE if and only if they solve the system of ordinary differential
equations: 
0 = S˙t + StL+ L
†St − StBR−1B†St +Q, ST = 0
0 = S˙t + StL(cl)(t) + L†St − StBR−1B†St + St[F,G]−Q[H1, H], ST = 0
0 = s˙t + (L
† − StBR−1B†)st + StC(cl)(t)−Qη, sT = 0.
(29)
The first equation is a standard symmetric matrix Riccati equation. As before, the fact that Q is
symmetric and non-negative definite and R is symmetric and positive definite imply that this Riccati
equation has a unique solution on [0, T ]. Note that its solution St is symmetric and independent of the
inputs feedback functions φ0 and φ giving the controls chosen by the major player and the other minor
players. Injecting the solution St into the second and third equations, leads to a linear system of ordinary
differential equations which can be readily solved. Given such a solution we find that the optimal control
can be expressed as:
α˜∗t = −
1
2
R−1B†[StXt + StXt + st] (30)
which is indeed an affine function of Xt, X
0
t and X¯t.
Now that the two optimization problems are solved, we can tackle the fixed point step. We just
proved that the best response map leaves the set of affine controls of the forms (21) and (22) invariant.
This suggests that we can look for a fixed point in this set. For such a fixed point, we must have:
α0,∗t = φ
0(t,X0t , Xt) = φ
0
0(t) + φ
0
1(t)X
0
t + φ
0
2(t)Xt,
and:
α˜∗t = φ(t,Xt, X
0
t , X¯t) = φ0(t) + φ1(t)Xt + φ2(t)X
0
t + φ3(t)Xt,
which translates into the following equations:
[φ02(t), φ
0
1(t)] = −
1
2
R−10 B
†
0Kt, φ
0
0(t) = −
1
2
R−10 B
†
0kt,
[φ3(t), φ2(t)] = −1
2
R−1B†St, φ1(t) = −1
2
R−1B†St, φ0(t) = −1
2
R−1B†st.
To complete the construction of the equilibrium, it thus remain to determine the quantities Kt, kt, St, St
and st from the systems (27) and (29). As we already noticed, the second equation of (27) can be used
to determine kt from Kt. As for (29), St can be obtained by solving the first equation on its own, and
once this is done the third equation of (29) can be used to determine st from St. In other words, we can
solve for St by solving the first equation of (29), and then group the remaining four equations into two
systems of ordinary differential equations as follows:
0 = K˙t +Kt[L(t)− BR−1B†St] + [L(t)− BR−1B†St]†Kt
−KtB0R−10 B†0Kt + L0
0 = S˙(t) + StA˚(t) + [L† − StBR−1B†]St − StBR−1B†St
−StB0R−10 B†0Kt + [StF −QH1, StG−QH]
(31)
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and {
0 = k˙t + [L(t)− BR−1B†St]†kt −KtB0R−10 B†0kt −KtBR−1B†st + f0
0 = s˙t + [L
† − StBR−1B†]st − StB0R−10 B†0kt − StBR−1B†st −Qη
(32)
with 0 as terminal condition, where we used the notation:
L(t) := L0 −
[
BR−1B†St 0
0 0
]
.
The first system (31) comprises two mildly coupled matrix Riccati equations, while the system (32), once
the solutions of the first system are identified and substituted for, is a plain linear system whose solution
is standard. In other words, the functions t 7→ kt and t 7→ st can easily be determined once a solution
t 7→ (Kt, St) of system (31) is found. In essence, we proved the following verification theorem.
Theorem 2. If the system (31) of matrix Riccati equations is well posed, then there exists a Nash
equilibrium in the family of linear closed loop feedback controls, the optimal controls for the major and
minor players being given by the strategies (28) and (30).
4 Application
In this final section, we apply the theoretical results derived above to a model of flocking inspired by the
mean field game formulation proposed in [8] to generalize a basic descriptive model originally proposed by
Cucker and Smale in [5]. In this section, we borrow from the terminology used in the dynamical systems
literature on large population behavior, and we call the major player the leader while the minor players
are call followers. However, the reader should not be misled by this terminology: we are not solving
a leader-follower game, we are solving for a Nash equilibrium for the mean field game with major and
minor players.
, in which the dynamics of a large population of agents are governed by forces depicting the mean
reversion of individual’s velocity to the mean velocity of the population. Later on, Huang (reference)
formulates the flocking model into a mean field game, where the emergent behavior is obtained by the
Nash equilibrium of the game. While early models of flocking does not involve any form of central
coordination, several authors recently propose generalization of the flocking model by introducing leaders
in the population. Such leader has a pivotal impact on the rest of the population. In this spirit, we
generalize Huang’s formulation of flocking mean field game by introducing a free-will leader pursuing a
prescribed schedule of velocity.
Given a population of N minor players (followers), we denote by V 0,Nt the velocity of the major player
(leader) at time t, and by V n,Nt the velocity of the n-th follower. The leader and the followers control the
drifts of their velocities whose dynamics are given as Itoˆ processes:{
dV 0,Nt = α
0
t dt+ Σ0dW
0
t
dV n,Nt = α
n
t dt+ ΣdW
n
t
(33)
where the d-dimensional Wiener processes {W i = (W it )0≤t≤T ; i = 0, 1, · · · , N} are independent, and
Σ0 and Σ are constant d × d matrices. We also assume that we are given a deterministic function
[0, T ] 3 t → νt ∈ Rd representing the leader’s free will, namely the velocity the major player would like
to have while keeping a reasonable distance from the pack. If we denote by V¯ Nt :=
1
N
∑N
n=1 V
n,N
t the
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average velocity of the followers, the objective of the leader is to minimize its expected costs over the
horizon T :
J0 = E
[∫ T
0
(
λ0‖V 0,Nt − νt‖2 + λ1‖V 0,Nt − V¯ Nt ‖2 + (1− λ0 − λ1)‖α0t ‖2
)
dt
]
where λ0 and λ1 are positive real numbers satisfying λ0 +λ1 ≤ 1. Similarly, each follower faces a tradeoff
between keeping up with the leader and staying close to its peers. So the objective of the n-th follower
is to minimize:
Jn = E
[∫ T
0
(
l0‖V n,Nt − V 0,Nt ‖2 + l1‖V n,Nt − V¯ Nt ‖2 + (1− l0 − l1)‖αnt ‖2
)
dt
]
where l0 and l1 are positive reals satisfying l0 + l1 ≤ 1. While the above model is clearly linear quadratic,
it does not fit in the framework used in this paper. However, it is plain to remedy this problem by simply
doubling the state variable. More specifically, we define X0t := [V
0
t , V
0
t ], Xt := [Vt, Vt] and X¯t := [V¯t, V¯t]
and we pose:
L0 = L = F0 = F = G =
[
0 0
0 0
]
, B0 = B =
[
I
I
]
, D0 =
[
Σ0
Σ0
]
, D =
[
Σ
Σ
]
H =
[
I 0
0 0
]
, H0 = H1 =
[
0 0
0 I
]
, Q0 =
[
λ0I 0
0 λ1I
]
, Q =
[
l0I 0
0 l1I
]
η0(t) =
[
ν(t)
0
]
, η =
[
0
0
]
, R0 = (1− λ0 − λ1)I, R = (1− l0 − l1)I
We implemented the solution of this model in the d = 2 dimensional case choosing
ν(t) := [−2pi sin(2pit), 2pi cos(2pit)]
for the leader’s free-will. We also choose Σ0 = Σ = 0.5I2. For a given choice of penalty coefficients
λ0, λ1, l0, l1, we use Euler’s method to solve numerically the system of matrix Riccati equation (31) over
the horizon T = 5, and computing closed loop Nash equilibrium strategies of for the leader and the
representative follower in the mean field game limit.
We simulate the dynamics of the leader and N followers defined in (33), where we assign the equilib-
rium control strategies of the mean field game to the leader and each follower.
Figure 1 shows the trajectories (points in the plane) and the velocities (arrows) of the flock. The
leader’s trajectory is plotted in black and those of the followers in color. We observe that the prescribed
velocity ν is best followed by the flock when the leader cares more about pursuing its objective and the
followers are more committed to follow the leader, rather than sticking with the average of the population.
Conversely, if the individuals attribute more importance to staying close with the population, the flock
follows an erratic trajectory in the beginning and eventually reaches a common direction of movement.
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Figure 1: Optimal velocity and trajectory of follower and leaders
Our simulation also gives a peak into the effect of propagation of chaos, which states that in the limit
of an infinite number of followers, the velocities of the followers become independent conditioned on the
shock process driving the leader’s velocity. To visualize such an effect, for a given number of followers,
say N , we fix a realization of the Wiener processes W 0 driving the dynamics of the leader’s velocity. We
simulate S copies of the optimal paths V 0,Nt and V
n,N
t , n = 1, . . . , N where for each sample path we use
the same Wiener process we fixed before for the leader, but independent copy of Wiener process for each
of the followers. Then for a given t, we compute the sample correlation matrix of V
i,N,(1)
t , i = 1, . . . , 5,
which are the first components of the velocity of the first 5 followers at time t. Finally, we compute the
average of the correlation matrix across time t ≤ T . Figure 2 displays the average correlation matrices
for flocks of sizes N = 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 obtained by following the procedure described above. It can be
seen that the correlation between the followers’ velocities dramatically reduces to 0 as the size of the flock
grows. Indeed, the linearity of the leader and follower strategies implies that the whole system evolves
as a vector-valued OU process, and the velocity of any individual at a given time is Gaussian. Since
independence is equivalent to null correlation for Gaussian vectors, the convergence of the correlation
matrices provides a strong evidence of the conditional propagation of chaos.
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Figure 2: Conditional correlation of followers’ velocities
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